A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall Þrst agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignmentrent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness. * We would like to thank Ahmet Alkan and ú Insan Tunalõ for insightful discussions. Tayfun Sönmez thanks Koçbank for their research grant.
Introduction
A group of friends rent a house and they shall allocate its rooms and share the rent. Alternatively a group of friends consider renting a house but they shall Þrst agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. They will rent the house only if they can Þnd a room assignment-rent division which appeals to each of them.
In this paper we propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. In order to do that, a key Þrst step is formulating a notion of an overdemand. A well-known result in discrete mathematics -Hall's Theoremprovides an important hint concerning how this shall be done. Hall's Theorem suggests that the room market clears at price p if and only if for any group of agents the number of different rooms collectively demanded by the group is no less than the size of the group. Motivated by Hall's Theorem, Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] deÞne a set Q of objects to be minimally overdemanded at price p if (i) the number of agents demanding only objects in Q at price p is greater than the number of objects in Q and (ii) no strict subset of Q has the same property. Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] introduce this notion in the context of a closely related two-sided matching market and for their purposes it is sufficient to Þnd an arbitrary minimally overdemanded set of objects. We, on the other hand, need to construct the entire set of overdemanded rooms and merely considering minimally overdemanded sets do not suffice. We iteratively apply Demange, Gale & Sotomayor idea in order to Þnd the full set of overdemanded rooms.
Once the full set of overdemanded rooms is formulated the rest is an application of the well-known tâtonnement procedure: We initially set the prices equal and Þnd the full set of overdemanded rooms. If it is empty then the procedure stops, each agent is assigned a room in her demand and she pays an even share of the rent. Otherwise we continuously increase prices of all rooms in the full set of overdemanded rooms and continuously decrease prices of remaining rooms such that (i) prices of all rooms in the full set of overdemanded rooms are increased at the same rate,
(ii) prices of all remaining rooms are decreased at the same rate, and (iii) summation of prices stay constant at rent.
(Note that unless the full set of overdemanded rooms consists of half of the rooms, the rate of increase in prices of overdemanded rooms is different than the rate of decrease in remaining rooms.) At each instant the full set of overdemanded rooms is calculated using the updated prices and the price of a room increases at a given instant if and only if the room is overdemanded at that instant. The procedure stops when the full set of overdemanded rooms is empty, each agent is assigned a room in her demand and she pays the Þnal price of her assignment. We refer this tâtonnement procedure as the continuous-price auction.
The only instances that are crucial in the continuous price auction are those when some agent's demand set changes. It is only at those instances the full set of overdemanded rooms may change. We can analytically derive these instances using individual valuations and this observation allows us to formulate an equivalent discrete-price auction.
While our auction is dynamic, to be realistic for its real-life consumption it is more appropriate to interpret it as a sealed-bid auction where each agent reports her valuations for the rooms and a computer determines a room assignment together with a rent division via our auction.
Our continuous-price auction (or its discrete equivalent) can be useful only if it converges. Throughout the paper we assume that individual utilities are quasi-linear in prices and in Theorem 1 we show that our discrete-price auction (and hence our continuous-price auction as well) converges. We prove this result by showing that the summation of indirect utilities strictly decreases at each step of the discrete-price auction until it converges to a feasible level in Þnite steps.
Recently Brams & Kilgour [2001] and Haake, Raith & Su [2001] introduce other mechanisms for room assignment-rent division problems. So why shall one care for one additional mechanism? All three mechanisms are efficient so one cannot compare these mechanisms based on efficiency. Envy-freeness is widely considered the central notion of fairness in the context of room assignment-rent division problems. It can also be interpreted as a stability requirement since it is difficult to sustain envious allocations in real-life applications. In such situations there are agents who are eager to pay more than their occupants for some of the rooms. If the house is not rented yet, it will most likely not be rented unless the agents agree on an envy-free allocation. Based on these points we believe envy-freeness is essential for room assignment-rent division problems. In addition to envy-freeness, a mechanism should charge a non-negative price to each of the rooms for otherwise agents who are having a positive share of the rent will beneÞt by leaving the negative priced rooms empty. Unfortunately there exists situations where these two essential objectives cannot be met simultaneously. That is, there exists situations where at least one of the rooms has a negative price at each envy-free allocation. In these situations no matter what allocation is chosen someone will be upset. If agents have not already rented the house, they will either not rent it or they will not rent it altogether.
Brams & Kilgour [2001] observe this difficulty and they propose a mechanism which always charges a non-negative price to each of the rooms. A difficulty with their mechanism is that its outcome may be envious even in problems where there exists envy-free allocations with nonnegative prices. Haake, Raith & Su [2001] , on the other hand, propose an envy-free mechanism but a difficulty with their mechanism is that it may charge negative prices to some of the rooms even in problems where there exists envy-free allocations with non-negative prices. Our auction mechanism is envy-free (Corollary 1) and it charges each room a non-negative price unless there exists no envy-free allocation with non-negative prices (Theorem 2). We obtain this result by relating our auction to the well-known Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] exact auction that yields the buyer-optimal competitive price for a related class of two-sided matching markets.
There are two additional papers which are closely related to our paper. Alkan, Demange & Gale [1991] and Su [1999] analyze the structure of envy-free allocations for room-assignmentrent division problems. In addition Svensson [1983] , Maskin [1987] , Tadenuma & Thomson [1991] , Aragones [1995] and Klijn [2000] analyze a closely related fair division problem where a number of indivisible goods together with some money shall be fairly allocated to a number of agents. Envy-freeness play the key role in each of these papers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the model. In Section 3 we formulate the notion of the full set of overdemanded rooms and introduce our continuousprice auction as well as its discrete equivalent. In Section 4 we show that our auction converges and in Section 5 we show that it is efficient, envy-free and individually rational. In Section 6 we relate our auction to Demange, Gale & Sotomayor exact auction and show that our auction yields non-negative prices whenever there exists envy-free allocations with non-negative prices. Finally we conclude in Section 7.
The Model
A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall Þrst agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. Formally a room assignment-rent division problem is a four-tuple hI, R, V, ci where 1. I = {i 1 , . . . , i n } is a set of agents, 2. R = {r 1 , . . . , r n } is a set of rooms, 3. U = [u i ] i∈I is a utility function vector where u i : R × R → R denotes the utility function of agent i where utility of agent i for room r at price p r is given by u i (r, p r ).
4. c ∈ R ++ is the rent of the house.
Pick agent i and room r. We will assume that u i (r, p r ) is strictly decreasing in p r and differentiable in p r . We denote derivative of u i (r, p r ) at p r by u i0 (r, p r ). We will assume that u i 0 (r, p r ) is continuous and decreasing in p r and u i 0 (r, p r ) < M < 0 for some M, i.e.
bounded away from zero. 
Note that if this assumption fails for an agent that means the agent does not think that the house is worth the rent and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that such an agent will not rent the house. Throughout the paper we Þx a problem.
A matching µ is an assignment of rooms to agents such that each agent is assigned one and only one room. Let µ i denote the room assignment of agent i under µ and let M denote the set of matchings.
A price is a vector p ∈ R n . A price p is feasible if P r∈R p r = c. Let
denote the set of feasible prices.
An allocation is a matching-feasible price pair (µ, p) ∈ M×P. Here agent i ∈ I is assigned room µ i and her share of the rent is p µ i .
We assume that u i = 0 is the reservation utility for each agent and it corresponds to the utility of outside options.
A Market Approach
How shall one determine an allocation for a given problem? In this paper we propose an auction which mimics the market mechanism.
Given an agent i ∈ I and a price p ∈ R n , deÞne the demand of agent i at price p as
Let D(p) = (D i (p)) i∈I denote the list of individual demands at price p.
Given an agent i ∈ I and a price p ∈ R n , deÞne the indirect utility of agent i at price p
Given a price vector p ∈ R n , when can we Þnd a matching which assigns each agent a room in her demand? The answer of this question is given by Hall [1935] .
Hall's Theorem: Let p ∈ R n . There exists a matching µ ∈ M with µ i ∈ D i (p) for each i ∈ I if and only if
Hall's Theorem suggests that the room market clears at price p if and only if the cardinality of the union of demands of any group of agents is at least as big as the size of the group. Hall's Theorem is key to deÞne the set of overdemanded rooms at price p.
Overdemanded Rooms
Motivated by Hall's Theorem and following Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] deÞne a set of rooms to be overdemanded at price p if the number of agents demanding only rooms in this set is greater than the number of the rooms in the set. Formally S ⊂ R is overdemanded if |{i ∈ I : D i (p) ⊆ S}| > |S|. Note that this deÞnition allows a room to be overdemanded even though it is not demanded by any agent. For example suppose
Clearly the singleton {s} is an overdemanded set. The difficulty is that {s, r} is overdemanded as well for any r ∈ R regardless of the demands. This observation motivates the following deÞnition: A set of rooms is a minimal overdemanded set if it is overdemanded and none of its proper subsets is overdemanded.
Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] introduce these deÞnitions in the context of multiunit auctions and at each step of their auction they increase prices of objects in an arbitrary minimal overdemanded set by one unit. Since prices of the rooms shall add up to rent in the present context, we will increase prices of all "excessively demanded" rooms simultaneously and reduce prices of the remaining rooms. As the following example shows merely considering minimal overdemanded sets may not be sufficient for our purposes. Let I = {i, j, k, l} and R = {a, b, c, d}. Suppose that the value matrix V and price p induce the following demands:
Here the only minimal overdemanded set is {a}. Nevertheless there is a clear "excess demand" for room b as well.
Motivated by this observation iteratively deÞne the full set of overdemanded rooms at price p as follows: Given p Þnd all minimal overdemanded sets. Remove these rooms from the demand of each agent and Þnd the minimal overdemanded sets for the modiÞed demand proÞles. Proceed in a similar way until there is no minimal overdemanded set for the modiÞed demand proÞles. The full set of overdemanded rooms is the union of each of the sets encountered in the procedure.
In the earlier example the singleton {a} is a minimal overdemanded set. Once room a is removed from the demand of each agent we have D k (p) \ {a} = D l (p) \ {a} = {b} and hence room b is also included in the full set of overdemanded rooms at price p.
Let OD(p) denote the full set of overdemanded rooms at price p. The following lemma will be useful to deÞne our auction.
Proof : Let p ∈ R n and suppose that OD(p) = ∅. By deÞnition of OD(p) there is no minimal overdemanded set at price p and thus there is no overdemanded set either. Then for each J ⊆ I we have¯∪
would be an overdemanded set.
Conversely suppose that for every J ⊆ I we have¯∪ i∈J D i (p)¯≥ |J|. Then there are no overdemanded sets and hence OD(p) = ∅. ♦
The Continuous-Price Auction
We are now ready to propose an auction to Þnd a "market" allocation (µ, p) ∈ M × P:
1. Set initially the price of each room to c/n. That is, set p = ( Note that the auction procedure terminates when we reach a price vector p ∈ P with OD(p) = ∅. In the next section we show that our continuous-price auction converges.
Convergence
Let p ∈ P be a price vector that is obtained at an instant of our continuous-price auction. DeÞne
That is, J(p) is the set of agents each of whom only demand rooms in the full set of overdemanded rooms.
Proof: Let p ∈ P with OD(p) 6 = ∅. Consider the construction of the full set of overdemanded rooms. Let S 1 be an arbitrary minimal overdemanded set and let
Otherwise remove rooms in S 1 from the demand of each agent and let S 2 be an arbitrary minimal overdemanded set for the modiÞed market. Let 
We next show that our auction converges. For this purpose we will prove the convergence result Theorem 1: The price path in the continuous price auction converges to a price p
Proof : Here is our proof strategy. Consider any two prices p and q in the price path of the continuous price auction such that OD(p) 6 = ∅ and price vector q is obtained after p. We will show that
i.e. this sum strictly decreases at each step as long as OD(p) is non-empty. Since this sum is bounded from above by 0, this implies that (i) this sum will converge and (ii) there will be a limit price p * such that OD(p * ) = ∅ and we obtain the desired convergence result.
Now consider the instance that continuous price auction reaches price p. Consider each agent i such that there is a room r which she does not demand at price p. Hence e u i (p) > u i (r, p r ). By continuity of utility functions in p r we can Þnd a sufficiently small ² > 0 such that when we increase the prices of rooms in OD(p) by n−|OD(p)| n ² and decrease the price of rooms in R\OD(p) by |OD(p)| n ², each agent continues to demand a room she was demanding at price p. Let this new price be p 0 . Note that p 0 is in the price path of the continuous price auction since P
.
Proof of the Claim: Let t ≥ 0 be such that OD(p t ) 6 = ∅. We consider agents in J(p t ) and agents in I \ J(p t ) separately.
and by construction of f r (p t ) we have
and therefore
2. Let i ∈ I\J(p t ) and a ∈ D i (p t )\OD(p t ). Since i 6 ∈ J(p t ), such a room necessarily exists.
By construction of f a (p t ) we have
n − |OD(p t )| − 1. These together with Equations 2 and 3 imply
completing the proof of the Claim as well as the theorem. ♦
Efficiency, Envy-Freeness and Individual Rationality
Efficiency and fairness often play key roles in evaluation of mechanisms for various resource allocation problems. Envy-freeness (Foley [1967] ) is widely considered the central notion of fairness in the context of room assignment-rent division problems. An allocation (µ, p) ∈ M × P is envy-free if and only if
for all η ∈ M and q ∈ P.
Since utilities are quasi-linear in prices, an allocation (µ, p) ∈ M × P is efficient if and only if P
for all η ∈ M. Therefore prices have no signiÞcance for efficiency considerations.
♦.
Corollary 1:
The outcome of our auction is envy-free.
Svensson [1983] (????) shows that envy-freeness implies efficiency in the context of room assignment-rent division problems.
Proposition 2 (Svensson [1983] ): Let (µ, p) ∈ M × P be an envy-free allocation. Then (µ, p) is efficient.
Corollary 2:
The outcome of our auction is efficient.
Since our auction mimics the market mechanism, Corollary 2 can be interpreted as a First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics in the present context.
A mechanism should ensure that each agent receives a non-negative utility in order to sustain the stability of its outcome. Otherwise agents may opt-out and receive their reservation utilities each of which is 0. Proof : Let (µ, p) ∈ M × P be the outcome of our auction.
Room Assignment-Rent Division with Quasi-Linear Utilities
In this section, we will inspect the special case when utility functions of agents are quasi-linear in money i.e. for each agent i ∈ I we have
for each room r and price p r . We will call u i (r, 0) as the value of agent i for room r and denote it by v i r . In this environment, we will deÞne a discrete version of our continuous auction procedure, and we will then prove that this auction Þnds a positive envy-free price vector whenever one exists.
In the continuous-price auction the only instances that are crucial are those instances where some agent's demand changes. At these instances the full set of overdemanded rooms may possibly change. Between two such instances prices of overdemanded rooms increase uniformly and prices of the remaining rooms decrease uniformly in such a way that the sum of the prices stay constant at c. This observation allows us to formulate the following discrete equivalent of our continuous-price auction.
An Equivalent Discrete-Price Auction for Quasi-Linear Utilities
In order to introduce the discrete equivalent of our auction we need additional notation.
Let p 0 be the Þrst price vector obtained in the continuous-price auction after price p where an agent's demand set gets larger. Such an agent is necessarily a member of J(p). That is because (i) each agent in I \ J(p) demands a room in R \ OD(p) and prices of these rooms have been falling uniformly, and (ii) utilities are quasi-linear in prices. Therefore the full set of overdemanded rooms may only change when an agent in J(p) demands a room in R \ OD(p). DeÞne
Consider any pair of rooms r, s such that r ∈ OD(p) and s ∈ R \ OD(p). The price differential (p r −p s ) increases at the same rate for any pair of such rooms until the full set of overdemanded rooms changes. As we have already mentioned this may only happen when an agent in J(p) demands a room in R \ OD(p) and x(p) is the minimum price differential needed for that to happen. When price of room r ∈ OD(p) increases to p r + n−|OD(p)| n x(p) and price of room
By construction p 0 = (f r (p)) r∈R is the Þrst price vector obtained in the continuous-price auction where an agent's demand set gets larger. We are now ready to introduce the discrete equivalent of our continuous-price auction:
Step 0:
for each i ∈ I, set p = p 0 and terminate the procedure. If OD(p 0 ) 6 = ∅ then proceed to Step 1.
In general,
Step t:
for each i ∈ I, set p = p t and terminate the procedure. If OD(p t ) 6 = ∅ then proceed to
Step t+1.
Before we show that the discrete-price auction converges, we give a detailed example which illustrates the dynamics of the discrete-price auction.
Example: Let the set of agents be I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , i 4 , i 5 , i 6 }, the set of rooms be R = {a, b, c, d, e, f }, the valuation matrix be
and the rent be 60.
Step 0: p 0 = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10). In order to obtain the demand of each agent at p 0 , we shall Þnd utilities of agents over rooms at p 0 . In the following utility matrix indirect utilities of agents are given in bold:
Therefore the demand of each agent at p 0 is as follows:
Next we Þnd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p 0 :
Iteration 1: S 1 = {f } is minimally overdemanded since each of the agents in J 1 = {i 1 , i 4 } demand only room f . S 1 is the unique minimal overdemanded set. Remove S 1 from the demand of each agent. Iteration 2: S 2 = {b} is minimally overdemanded once room f is removed from the demands.
That is because agents in J 2 = {i 3 , i 5 } demand only room b once room f is removed from the demands. (That is,
is the unique minimal overdemanded set once room f is removed from the demands. Remove S 2 from the demand of each agent. Iteration 3: S 3 = {e} is minimally overdemanded once rooms f , b are removed from the demands. That is because agents in J 3 = {i 2 , i 6 } demand only room e once rooms f , b are removed from the demands. S 3 is the unique minimal overdemanded set once rooms f , b are removed from the demands. Remove S 3 from the demand of each agent. Iteration 4: There are no minimal overdemanded sets once rooms f , b and e are removed from demands. Therefore OD(p 0 ) = S 1 ∪ S 2 ∪ S 3 = {b, e, f } and
Since OD(p 0 ) 6 = ∅ we proceed with Step 1.
Step 1: We determine p 1 as follows:
Therefore for each r ∈ R, we have
and hence p 1 = (8, 12, 8, 8, 12, 12) . Utility matrix at p 1 is given as follows:
4 −3 13 i 5 −2 10 −3 −3 −2 0 i 6 −2 −3 −6 13 13 −3
Therefore the demand of each agent at p 1 is as follows:
Next we Þnd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p 1 :
Iteration 1: S 1 = {f } is minimally overdemanded since each of the agents in J 1 = {i 1 , i 4 } demand only room f . S 1 is the unique minimal overdemanded set. Remove S 1 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 2: S 2 = {b} is minimally overdemanded once room f is removed from the demands.
That is because agents in J 2 = {i 3 , i 5 } demand only room b once room f is removed from the demands. S 2 is the unique minimal overdemanded set once room f is removed from the demands. Remove S 2 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 3: There are no minimal overdemanded sets once rooms f and b are removed from demands.
we proceed with Step 2.
Step 2: We determine p 2 = f (p 1 ) as follows: and hence p 2 = (7, 14, 7, 7, 11, 14) . Utility matrix at p 2 is given as follows: Therefore the demand of each agent at p 2 is as follows:
Next we Þnd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p 2 :
Iteration 1: S 4 = {b, d, e, f } is minimally overdemanded since each of the agents in J 4 = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , i 5 , i 6 } demands only rooms from S 4 . S 4 is the unique minimal overdemanded set.
Remove S 4 from the demand of each agent. Iteration 2: There are no minimal overdemanded sets once rooms b, d, e, and f are removed from demands.
we proceed with Step 3.
Step 3: We determine p 3 as follows: Therefore for each r ∈ R we have
and hence p 3 = (5, 15, 5, 8, 12, 15) . Utility matrix at p 3 is given as follows: Therefore the demand of each agent at p 3 is as follows:
Next we Þnd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p 3 :
Iteration 1: There are no minimal overdemanded sets.
Therefore OD(p 3 ) = ∅ and hence we terminate the procedure. We have
and therefore either of the allocations (µ 1 , p 3 ) or (µ 2 , p 3 ) can be obtained as an outcome of our auction.¤
An Equivalent Discrete-Price Auction
Lemma 2: For each p ∈ P with OD(p) 6 = ∅ we have |J(p)| > |OD(p)| .
Otherwise remove rooms in S 1 from the demand of each agent and let S 2 be an arbitrary minimal overdemanded set for the modiÞed market. Let J 2 = {i ∈ I : D i (p) \ S 1 ⊆ S 2 }. Note that J 1 and J 2 are disjoint sets. By deÞnition we have S 2 ⊆ OD(p) and |J 2 | > |S 2 |. Proceeding in a similar way we obtain
♦ Let p 0 be the Þrst price vector obtained in the continuous-price auction after price p where an agent's demand set gets larger. Such an agent is necessarily a member of J(p). That is because (i) each agent in I \ J(p) demands a room in R \ OD(p) and prices of these rooms have been falling uniformly, and (ii) utilities are quasi-linear in prices. Therefore the full set of overdemanded rooms may only change when an agent in J(p) demands a room in R \ OD(p). DeÞne
By construction p 0 = (f r (p)) r∈R is the Þrst price vector obtained in the continuous-price auction
where an agent's demand set gets larger. We are now ready to introduce the discrete equivalent of our continuous-price auction:
Step 0: In general,
Step t: Set p t r = f r (p t−1 ) for all r ∈ R. If OD(p t ) = ∅ then Þnd a matching µ such that
Example: Let the set of agents be I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , i 4 , i 5 , i 6 }, the set of rooms be R = {a, b, c, d, e, f }, the valuation matrix be and the rent be 60.
is the unique minimal overdemanded set once room f is removed from the demands. Remove S 2 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 3: S 3 = {e} is minimally overdemanded once rooms f , b are removed from the demands. That is because agents in J 3 = {i 2 , i 6 } demand only room e once rooms f , b are removed from the demands. S 3 is the unique minimal overdemanded set once rooms f , b are removed from the demands. Remove S 3 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 4: There are no minimal overdemanded sets once rooms f , b and e are removed from demands.
Step 2: We determine
Therefore for each r ∈ R we have 7, 14, 7, 7, 11, 14) . Utility matrix at p 2 is given as follows: Therefore the demand of each agent at p 2 is as follows:
and therefore either of the allocations (µ 1 , p 3 ) or (µ 2 , p 3 ) can be obtained as an outcome of our auction.¤ An important difficulty about envy-freeness is that for some problems at least one of the prices is negative at each envy-free allocation: For example let I = {i, j}, R = {a, b}, c = 10 and let the valuations be (v Brams & Kilgour [2001] give up envy-freeness based on this difficulty and their mechanism always gives non-negative prices. A disadvantage of their mechanism is that it may still choose envious allocations even though there exists envy-free allocations with non-negative prices.
We believe that cases like the earlier example are rather unlikely in real-life applications by the nature of the problem. It is unlikely that agents i and j will jointly rent this house when both are eager to pay more than the rent for room a and almost nothing for room b. In this case whoever has the lease will most likely Þnd another roommate or rent the house alone.
Haake, Raith & Su [2001] insist on envy-freeness but their mechanism may yield negative prices even though there exists envy-free allocations with non-negative prices. By Corollary 1 our auction is envy-free as well. Therefore it admits negative prices if there exists no envyfree allocation with non-negative prices. However unlike the mechanism of Haake, Raith & Su [2001] , our auction mechanism yields an envy-free allocation with non-negative prices whenever such an allocation exists. We shall introduce a related model and relate our auction to the well-known auction of Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] in order to prove this result.
A Two-Sided Matching Model
We next turn our attention to a two-sided matching model analyzed by Demage, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] . 1 Let I = {i 1 , . . . , i n } be a set of buyers and R = {r 1 , . . . , r n } be a set of objects. Each buyer has use for one and only one object and V = [v i r ] i∈I,r∈R is a value matrix where v i r ≥ 0 denotes the value of object r for buyer i.
A matching µ is an assignment of objects to buyers such that each buyer is assigned one and only one object. A price is a vector p ∈ R n . Let the reservation price of each object be 0. Therefore in the present context we only consider non-negative prices. Each buyer i ∈ I is endowed with a utility function u i : R × R + → R which is quasi-linear in prices:
Note that the key difference between the two models is the following: The prices shall add up to c in room assignment-rent division problems whereas the only constraint in the present two-sided matching model is that the price of each object shall be non-negative (i.e. no less than its reservation price).
As in the case of room assignment-rent division problems, the demand of buyer i ∈ I at price p ∈ R n + is given by
Given a price p ∈ R n , notions of overdemanded set, minimal overdemanded set, full set of overdemanded objects and the price differential x(p) are deÞned as in room assignment-rent division problems. The price p ∈ R n + is competitive if there exists a matching µ such that µ i ∈ D i (p) for all i ∈ I. The pair (µ, p) is refereed as a competitive equilibrium. Shapley & Shubik [1972] show that competitive equilibria always exist and there exists a competitive price p ∈ R n + such that p r ≤ q r for all r ∈ R and for any competitive price q ∈ R n + . We refer p as the buyer-optimal competitive price.
Demange, Gale & Sotomayor Exact Auction
Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] assumes that the value matrix is integer valued and provides the following auction which yields the buyer-optimal competitive price.
Step 0: Set p 0 = (0, . . . , 0). If there exists no minimal overdemanded set at p 0 then Þnd a matching µ such that µ i ∈ D i (p 0 ) for each i ∈ I, set p DGS = p 0 and terminate the procedure.
Otherwise proceed to Step 1.
Step t: Pick an arbitrary minimal overdemanded set S at price p t−1 . Let p for each r ∈ R \ S. If there exists no minimal overdemanded set at p t then Þnd a matching µ such that µ i ∈ D i (p t ) for each i ∈ I, set p DGS = p t and terminate the procedure. Otherwise proceed to Step t+1.
We refer this auction as DGS exact auction.
Theorem (Demange, Gale & Sotomayor): DGS exact auction yields the buyer-optimal competitive price.
While Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] assumes that valuations are integer valued, it is straightforward to extend their auction as well as their result for real-valued valuations.
The ModiÞed Discrete-Price Auction
Consider the following price updating rule at any price q ∈ R n + : Construct the full set of overdemanded rooms OD(q) at price q and Þnd x(q). Recall that
We are now ready to deÞne the modiÞed discrete-price auction which will be key to relate our discrete-price auction (and hence our continuous-price auction as well) with DGS exact auction.
Step 0: Set q 0 = (0, . . . , 0). If OD(q 0 ) = ∅ then Þnd a matching µ such that µ i ∈ D i (q 0 ) for each i ∈ I, set q = q 0 and terminate the procedure. If OD(q 0 ) 6 = ∅ then proceed to Step 1.
In general, Step t: Set q t r = g r (q t−1 ) for all r ∈ R. If OD(q t ) = ∅ then Þnd a matching µ such that
for each i ∈ I, set q = q t and terminate the procedure. If OD(q t ) 6 = ∅ then proceed to
We need the following lemma in order to relate the modiÞed discrete-price auction and the discrete-price auction.
Lemma 3: Let p, q ∈ R n be such that p r = q r + k for all r ∈ R and some k ∈ R. Then
Proof : Fix p, q ∈ R n and k ∈ R such that p r = q r + k for all r ∈ R. Since utilities are quasi-linear in prices, we have u i (r, p r ) = v i r − p r = v i r − (q r + k) = u i (r, q r ) − k for all i ∈ I and r ∈ R.
1. Fix i ∈ I. For any r ∈ R we have
and hence
We are ready to relate the modiÞed discrete-price auction and the discrete-price auction. Next we will relate the modiÞed discrete-price auction and DGS exact auction clarifying the relation between our discrete-price auction and DGS exact auction. Proof : Let {p t } T t=0 be the price sequence obtained by the discrete price auction and {q t } be the price sequence obtained by the modiÞed discrete-price auction.
Claim: For each t ≤ T , we have
Proof of the Claim: We will prove the claim by induction. By construction of the modiÞed discrete-price auction we have q 
Equivalence of DGS Exact Auction and the ModiÞed Discrete Price Auction
We are now ready to relate the modiÞed discrete-price auction and DGS exact auction: Both auctions yield the buyer-optimal competitive price.
Proposition 5: Let {q t } T t=0 be the price sequence obtained by the modiÞed discrete-price auction and let p DGS be the Þnal price obtained by DGS exact auction. We have q T = p DGS .
Proof : We will consider a general format of DGS exact auction where prices of rooms in a minimal overdemanded set are increased by a sufficiently small increment. Let {q t } T t=0 be the price sequence obtained by the modiÞed discrete-price auction. Recall that initial price vector is (0, . . . , 0) for the modiÞed discrete-price auction as well as DGS exact auction. We will show that by an appropriate choice of 1. the order of minimal overdemanded sets and 2. the price increments, price q 1 can be reached by DGS exact auction. Iteration of the same argument shows that prices q 2 , . . . , q T can as well be reached by DGS exact price auction. Once q T has been reached, OD(q T ) = ∅ implies that there exists no minimal overdemanded set and hence DGS exact auction terminates yielding p DGS = q T .
For any p ∈ R n , recall the construction of OD(p): We Þnd all minimal overdemanded sets.
We remove these rooms from the demand of each agent and Þnd the minimal overdemanded sets for the modiÞed demand proÞles. We proceed in a similar way until there exists no minimal overdemanded set for the modiÞed demand proÞles. The full set of overdemanded rooms OD(p) is the union of each of the sets encountered in the procedure. 0 . The following pair of observations will be key to our proof.
Observation 1 : Consider an increase in some of the prices while the remaining prices stay put. A minimal overdemanded set S remains minimal overdemanded provided that prices of the rooms in S stay put.
Observation 2: Suppose prices of all rooms in S m 1 α=1 S one at a time and increase prices of all rooms in these sets by ² 0 one set at a time. Following in a similar way we will reach a price vector p via DGS exact auction where p r = ² 0 for r ∈ OD(q 0 ) and p r = 0 for r 6 ∈ OD(q 0 ).
Here the key observation is the following: Since ² 0 < x(q 0 ) and since the price of each room in OD(q 0 ) has only increased by ² 0 we have OD(p) = OD(q 0 ). (Recall that x(q 0 ) is the minimum price differential needed for the full set of overdemanded rooms to change). Therefore we can replicate the same sequence of price increases`0 −1 additional times through DGS exact auction. When we do that we reach to a price p with p r =`0² 0 = x(q 0 ) = q 1 . Iterating the earlier arguments we can Þrst increase prices of all rooms in OD(q 1 ) by ² 1 and replicate this an additional`1 − 1 times to reach p = q 2 via DGS exact auction. Proceeding in a similar way we can reach p = q T via DGS exact auction. Once we reach p = q T , since OD(q T ) = ∅ there are no minimal overdemanded sets and hence DGS exact auction terminates. Therefore q T = p DGS . ♦ cannot insist on both envy-freeness and strategy-proofness. Analyzing equilibria of preference manipulation games induced by our auction mechanism is an important and interesting exercise but this is beyond the scope of the current paper.
